Sudan's infrastructure : a continental perspective by Ranganathan, Rupa & Briceno-Garmendia, Cecilia M.

























































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5815
Improvements in infrastructure across Sudan in recent 
years have contributed 1.7 percentage points to the 
country’s per capita growth. Consistent with trends in 
other countries, the ICT revolution that swept Africa 
contributed more than any other sector to growth in 
Sudan. Raising the infrastructure endowment of all 
parts of Sudan to that of the region’s best performer—
Mauritius—could boost annual growth by about 3.5 
percentage points.
   Sudan has heavily invested in infrastructure in recent 
years. Notable achievements include tripling power-
generation capacity, liberalizing the ICT sector, and 
connecting to an undersea fiber-optic cable. Looking 
ahead, Sudan’s most pressing infrastructure challenges lie 
in the water and transport sectors. In the water sector, 
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Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at cbricenogarmendi@worldbank.org.  
the country needs to dramatically improve access to safe 
sources of water and sanitation while improving utility 
efficiency. In the transport sector the country needs to 
vastly expand rural and international connectivity and 
improve quality across the network.
   Sudan presently spends about $1.5 billion per year 
on infrastructure, with $580 million a year lost to 
inefficiencies. Even if the inefficiencies were eliminated, 
however, Sudan would face an infrastructure funding 
gap of $2.9 billion per year. This gap could be reduced 
by half by choosing lower-cost water, sanitation, and 
road-surfacing technologies, and could be bridged by 
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Improvements in infrastructure in all parts of Sudan in recent years have had a strong impact on per 
capita growth, contributing 1.7 percentage points. Consistent with trends in other countries, the 
information and communication (ICT) revolution that swept Africa contributed the most to Sudan. 
Raising the infrastructure endowment of all parts of Sudan to that of the region’s best performer, 
Mauritius, could boost annual growth by about 3.5 percentage points.  
Sudan has invested heavily in infrastructure in recent years, with some notable achievements. Power 
generation capacity tripled in just a few years, rising from around 800 megawatts (MW) in 2005 to 2,687 
MW in 2007, with a shift toward hydropower. Nevertheless, service reliability remains an issue. In ICT, 
Sudan has made enormous strides in liberalizing the sector and as a result has attracted significant private 
capital. Mobile penetration soared from less than 1 percent in 2000 to 33 percent in 2009. Recent 
connectivity to an undersea fiber-optic cable has led to expansions in access, improvements in quality, 
and reduction in prices.  
Looking ahead, Sudan’s most pressing infrastructure challenges lie in the water and transport sectors. 
Most of Sudan lacks access to safe sources of water. Access to sanitation is bimodal, where 40 
percent of the population uses improved sanitation technologies and around 40 percent defecates in the 
open. Access challenges have been compounded by large inefficiencies at the water utilities. Inadequate 
collection of revenues, large distributional losses, and to some extent inability to recover costs have 
diverted over $120 million in revenues each year.  
In the transport sector, even though the road network almost doubled in length to 6,200 kilometers 
(km) between 2000 and 2008, a sizable share of the country lacks roads. There are a few well-developed 
internal corridors, but rural connectivity is almost nonexistent. Road density is exceedingly low and 
traffic along most roads is sparse. Poor-quality roads drastically undermine the efficiency of transport 
services. Further, the large volumes of unpaved roads make movement impossible during the rainy 
season. 
Sudan’s infrastructure development has so far had a national focus, and there is much that remains to 
be done to achieve greater regional integration. While internal road corridors are developed, connectivity 
with neighbors is largely absent. Sudan has a natural gateway to the sea through Port Sudan but the port’s 
performance is severely hindered by long dwell times, high costs, and capacity constraints. Looking 
further ahead, Sudan has the potential to be a major hydropower exporter if additional capacity could be 
developed and transmission links with neighboring Nile Basin countries strengthened. 
Addressing Sudan’s infrastructure challenges will require sustained expenditure of almost $4.2 billion 
per year over the next decade, mainly for capital investments. In terms of the size of the economy that 
level of infrastructure needs is equivalent to just over 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Not 
unthinkable of, as it is comparable to the 15 percent of GDP China has been investing in recent years on 
infrastructure. Yet, it is an ambitious target for Sudan as it would represent almost tripling the recently 
observed annual average of  infrastructure spending (about 7 percent of GDP). Water and transport 
account for 80 percent of the spending needs.  SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Sudan already spends approximately $1.5 billion per year on infrastructure, equivalent to about 6 
percent of its GDP. Two-thirds of Sudan’s spending consists of investment, with Chinese funds 
accounting for 40 percent of investment finance. Private investment in Sudanese infrastructure is also 
significant, at 23 percent of the total, while official development assistance (ODA) is negligible. In 
contrast to its peers, Sudan’s capital spending on infrastructure is strongly skewed toward the power 
sector. 
A further $580 million a year (equivalent to 2.7 percent of GDP) is wasted due to inefficiencies, 
largely due to mispricing of power. Over 80 percent of these inefficiencies derive from the power sector. 
Electricity is currently priced at 50 percent of its cost-recovery threshold, leading to losses worth $378 
million annually. The mispricing of power results in inefficiencies on the order of $380 million for the 
utility, while distribution losses are worth $106 million annually.  
Sudan’s annual infrastructure funding gap is $2.9 billion per year, equivalent to almost 14 percent of 
its GDP. Most of the funding gap is associated with the water and transport sectors, each of which is more 
than $1 billion short of resources. But these gaps could each be reduced by half by judicious choice of 
lower-cost technologies for water and sanitation services and road surfacing. No funding gap is found for 
power, due to the relatively high level of spending in recent years and the magnitude of inefficiencies that 
could be captured to bolster sector finances. 
To bridge the funding gap, Sudan could build on its existing success in capturing infrastructure 
finance both from China and the private sector. Sudan has done quite well in attracting about 1 percent of 
GDP in private investment for infrastructure; but a number of other African peers have done even better, 
capturing two to three times as much in proportional terms. Nevertheless, the largest funding gaps in 
transport and water may be less amenable to private finance. One option would be for Sudan to draw 
increasingly on its Chinese and Arab partners to support transport and water investments, and allow the 
private sector to play a larger role in the power sector, where it has not been active to date. Nevertheless, 
the funding gap remains substantial relative to the Sudanese economy. 
The continental perspective 
The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has gathered and analyzed extensive data on 
infrastructure in more than 40 Sub-Saharan countries, including Sudan. The results have been presented in 
reports covering different areas of infrastructure—ICT, irrigation, power, transport, and water and 
sanitation—and different policy areas, including investment needs, fiscal costs, and sector performance. 
This report presents the key AICD findings for Sudan, allowing the country’s infrastructure situation 
to be benchmarked against that of its African peers. Sudan is a relatively well-off low-income state richly 
endowed with oil; therefore, both low-income and resource-rich benchmarks will be used to evaluate its 
performance. Detailed comparisons will also be made with immediate regional neighbors in the East 
African Community (EAC) and with countries in North Africa in some cases. 
Several methodological issues should be borne in mind. First, because of the cross-country nature of 
data collection, a time lag is inevitable. The period covered by the AICD runs from 2001 to 2006. Most 
technical data presented are for 2006–07 (or the most recent year available), while financial data are SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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typically averaged over the available period to smooth out the effect of short-term fluctuations. Second, to 
make comparisons across countries, the indicators and analysis were standardized so that everything was 
done on a consistent basis. This means that some of the indicators presented here may be slightly different 
from those that are routinely reported and discussed at the country level. Third, in terms of nomenclature, 
all parts of Sudan refers to Sudan prior to the split of the country, Sudan refers to the northern part of 
Sudan, and South Sudan is the newly independent country. Fourth, data for Sudan and South Sudan were 
originally collected and processed for the country as a whole, that is, all parts of Sudan. But given recent 
geopolitical events, including the seceding of South Sudan from the rest of the country, and the vast 
differences between Sudan and South Sudan in terms of topography, infrastructure, and financial 
resources, this report presents analyses and results that reflect the situation in Sudan as much as possible. 
In a few cases, this involves relying on imperfect data and using proxy variables to attribute otherwise 
global estimates. 
Why infrastructure matters 
The recent schism of all parts of Sudan into Sudan and South Sudan will have massive impacts on the 
Sudanese economy. For one, the splitting of oil assets that are mostly in South Sudan will impact Sudan’s 
overall resource revenues in the coming years. 
The economy for all parts of Sudan grew at the rate of 6 percent per capita between 2003 and 2007. 
Its growth was more robust than that of several of its East African peers, who grew at 4 percent per capita 
during the same period.
1 The advent of an oil-based economy in Sudan was the harbinger of robust 
growth between 2000 and 2008. Oil constituted around 90 percent of Sudanese exports and was driven by 
oil production in South Sudan. Oil resources enabled the government to roll out new physical and social 
infrastructure, focused primarily on the northern part of the country. There was an increase in the volume 
of transportation between Khartoum, where economic activity has been concentrated, and Port Sudan, the 
coastal gateway for imports and exports. 
Empirical evidence linking infrastructure to recent economic growth patterns documents how the 
allocation of oil wealth to infrastructure development has impacted the economy. Between the 1990s and 
early 2000s, all parts of Sudan reaped large growth benefits in infrastructure development. Infrastructure 
contributed over 1.75 percentage points to all parts of Sudan’s per capita growth (figure 1a). The ICT 
sector made the strongest impact on growth. The road and power sectors made modest contributions in 
contrast to other countries, where inadequate power infrastructure had a negative effect on growth. Since 
most of the improvements in the ICT sector were recorded in Sudan and very little in South Sudan, it is 
reasonable to expect that the largest gains in growth came through contributions from the ICT sector in 
Sudan. 
                                                 
1 The growth represented is based on GDP per capita (constant 2000$). The East African peers are Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 1a. Infrastructure’s historic contribution to economic growth, 1990–95 vs 2000–05 
 
Source: Calderón 2009. 
Note: ICT = information and communication technology. 
 
Infrastructure could contribute more to all parts of Sudan’s infrastructure in the future than it has in 
the past (figure 1b). Simulations suggest that if Sudan’s infrastructure were to be upgraded to the level of 
the best-performing country in Africa (Mauritius), the impact on per capita economic growth would be on 
the order of 3.5 percentage points. While all areas of infrastructure—ICT, power, and transport—need to 
be upgraded, improvements in roads can impact growth the most—by around 1.5 percent. Improvements 
in power infrastructure will add another 1 percent to per capita growth. Infrastructure’s immediate 
potential contribution to growth is less than it is in several other East African countries.  
Figure 1b. Infrastructure’s potential future contribution to economic growth 
 
Source: Calderón 2009. 
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The state of Sudan’s infrastructure 
The spatial distribution of Sudan’s economy shows a sparse population with pockets of economic 
activity around a few urban centers. There is a heavier concentration of activity and population along the 
Nile (figure 2a). The topography of Sudan is divided into three regions—the deserts, the semi-arid Sahel 
region, and the wetlands and rain forests. The deserts in the north—the Nubian Desert to the east of the 
Nile, the Libyan Desert, and the rugged uplands to the northwest of the Nile—comprise around 30 percent 
of the area of Sudan. Central Sudan is characterized by the semi-arid Sahel region of steppes and low 
mountains. Southern Sudan has vast wetlands in the upper Nile region that are among the largest in the 
world. The Nile spans a vast length of Sudan’s territory. The tributaries of the Nile—the White Nile and 
Blue Nile—meet in Khartoum in the north. The White Nile crosses South Sudan from the Ugandan 
border, while the Blue Nile flows through east and central Sudan, irrigating a large part of the Sudanese 
land (figure 2b). Sudan is endowed with significant natural resource wealth in the form of metals and oil. 
There is one oilfield along the Red Sea in the north and another closer to the border of South Sudan 
(figure 2c). 
Figure 2. The demography, topography, and natural resources of all parts of Sudan 
a. Demography 
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c. Natural resources 
 
Source: AICD. 
Note: The topography information is derived from www.imcg.net/gpd/africa/sudan.pdf.. SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Road density in Sudan is among the lowest in Africa and the world. The existing road arteries are 
centered on Khartoum as the hub. One artery connects Khartoum with the coastal gateway of Port Sudan, 
a second connects Sudan with Egypt and North Africa, a third connects Khartoum with the Eritrean 
border, and a fourth leads to Ethiopia. Connections to South Sudan are fragmented; there is little traffic 
overall. In fact, along most of the networks, except between the Red Sea and Khartoum, traffic is sparse 
and road conditions patchy at best.  
Power infrastructure is developed only around select urban centers. A national grid is nonexistent, 
and there are no cross-border interconnectors. Power infrastructure is primarily focused on hydropower, 
with some thermal generation capacity. In recent years Sudan has benefitted from an increase in capacity, 
but there is an even greater hydropower potential that can be exploited (figure 3b).  
Sudan is naturally endowed to be a large producer and exporter of agricultural products. It is a 
riparian country, its fertile soil centered on the Nile, and areas of high suitability can be better exploited 
(figure 3c). 
The bright spot of Sudan’s infrastructure is the ICT sector. ICT growth has accelerated and is 
comparable to regional averages. Mobile subscriptions have grown exponentially, and Sudan boasts of 
one of the most liberalized ICT markets in Africa, with a strong multinational presence. It is also 
relatively well endowed with fiber-optic connectivity to several undersea cables (figure 3d).  
This report begins by reviewing the main achievements and challenges of each of Sudan’s major 
infrastructure sectors (table 1). Thereafter, attention will turn to the problem of how to finance the 
outstanding infrastructure needs. 
Figure 3. Development of the regional infrastructure backbone and national backbones in Sudan 
a. Roads in Sudan  b. Power infrastructure in all parts of Sudan 
   
   SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
  8 
c. ICT in all parts of Sudan  d. Water in all parts of Sudan 
   
Source: AICD.   
Table 1. Achievements and challenges in Sudan’s infrastructure sectors  
Sector  Achievements   Challenges 
Air transport  Strong international gateway in Sudan, with 
increasing traffic between Sudan and South Sudan. 
Per capita seats are higher than neighbors. Good 
connectivity with the Middle East, Europe, and 
Ethiopia. 
Raising air safety standards; increasing government oversight in 
air transport. 
 
Energy  Strong increase in installed capacity in Sudan 
between 2005 and 2009. Increasing reliance on 
hydropower. High reliance on modern fuels for 
cooking. Moderate tariffs for power. Strong record in 
collection of bills. 
Increasing the volume, reliability, and quality of electricity supply; 
tackling underpricing of services in the power utility to achieve 






Impressive increase in mobile penetration across the 
country. Tariffs compare favorably with African peers. 
Sudan has among the most liberalized telecom 
markets in Africa. Established regional infrastructure 
backbone for ICT with connection to undersea fiber-
optic cables. 
Expanding the Internet bandwidth from existing low levels;  
increasing the limited landline penetration. 
Ports  Increase in traffic in Port Sudan. Port authority has 
generated significant revenues and has used these 
funds for port infrastructure upgrades. Port Sudan 
becoming a feeder port. 
Reducing the long dwell times and truck cycle times at Port 
Sudan; tackling high handling charges at Port Sudan; minimizing 
port-congestion-related delays and challenges. 
Roads  Increase in kilometers of road in the period 2000–08. 
Some good-quality roads connect major urban 
centers. 
Improving quality of roads; connecting rural areas with national 
road network; enhancing efficiency of transport services; raising 
institutional capacity in road sector.  
Surface 
transport 
Lower freight tariffs charges compared to several 
African peers because of a competitive trucking 
industry and lower petroleum prices. Internal 
corridors are relatively well developed. 
Enhancing road connectivity with neighbors; lowering high costs 




  Boosting access to improved water and sanitation sources; 
reducing open defecation and reliance on surface water; attaining 
cost recovery for the water utility; tackling large distributional 
losses for utilities and improving collection of bills.  
Source: Summary based on analysis presented in this report. SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Transport 




Sudan’s transport infrastructure is 
unevenly developed. Despite a few road 
corridors, a large share of Sudan is 
unconnected or lacks paved roads. The 
networks consist of nearly 2,500 miles of 
single-track railroad with a feeder line 
(supplemented with limited river 
steamers) of about 1,200 miles of paved 
and gravel road—primarily in greater 
Khartoum and Port Sudan. In addition 
some roads in the north-south direction 
have been built, as well as an oil pipeline 
that is 840 miles long and runs from the oilfields in the Nuba Mountains and Khartoum to Port Sudan on 
the Red Sea 
Figure 5. Transport poses an obstacle to business in some areas of 
Sudan 
 
Source: World Bank 2009b. 
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 Around 22 percent of firms indicated that transport is a 
major obstacle to business activity, with challenges more 
acute in some areas than others. A sizable share of 
establishments in Sudan used their own transport facilities. 
The average share of own-transport use ranged from 35 
percent of the total value of production-related transport 
activities within the country in Khartoum to 17 percent in 
North Kordofan. Nyala Red Sea (with 26 percent) and 
Gezira (with 25 percent) also registered a high rate of own-
transport use. Transport in Nyala (Darfur region), 
meanwhile, was cited as a constraint on doing business by 
around 60 percent of the firms based there. 
 The main internal corridors in Sudan are well 
developed and generally in good condition but do not 
extend to provide cross-border connectivity with neighbors 
(see figure 4). The trading artery in Sudan is the route that 
connects Kosti to Port Sudan via Khartoum. This road 
records the greatest traffic volumes in Sudan and boasts 
overall good-quality roads, particularly from Khartoum to Port Sudan. Another corridor connects Sudan 
to the Djibouti Corridor offering connectivity to the Port of Djibouti and Addis Ababa. While systematic 
data on these routes are not available, traffic volumes from Sudan along this corridor are expected to be 
very low, and the quality of roads range from fair to poor. Connectivity with South Sudan is practically 
nonexistent and was never a strategic priority. The regional corridor connecting to South Sudan is in bad 
condition and records very low traffic volumes. During the rainy season (April/May to 
October/November), a majority of the roads particularly in South Sudan are impenetrable.  
Sudan records average performance by 
African standards but poor performance 
when compared to global standards. Along 
some of the internal transport routes, 
surface transport moves at a pace that 
ranges from 8.5 kilometers per hour 
(kmph)
2 to over 13 kmph,
3 comparable to 
East Africa; in the parts less travelled and 
with poorer-quality roads, velocity is 
consistent with central African countries 
(table 2). Overall, freight in Sudan moves at the pace of a horse and buggy. 
Poor road transport connectivity between Sudan and South Sudan requires the use of multimodal 
transport during half the year and is associated with lengthy transit times. Roads, particularly during the 
                                                 
2 This is the estimated velocity of traffic between Khartoum to Kosti. 
3 This is the estimated velocity of traffic between Khartoum and Port Sudan. 
against African aggregates for regional corridors 
Corridor 






(US cents per 
tonne-km) 
Western  72  6  8 
Central  49  6.1  13 
Eastern  82  8.1  7 
Southern  100  11.6  5 
Sudan  26  8.5–13.5  8–10 
South Sudan  0  6.4  20 
Source: Teravaninthorn and Raballand 2009; Nathan 
2010; UNLJC and FAO 2005; Yoshino 2010; World Bank 
staff estimates 
Note: Estimates for Sudan based on routes from 
Khartoum to Kosti and Khartoum to Port Sudan. For South 
Sudan, costs are based on varying estimates for travel 
between Juba to Nimule. Implicit velocity is the total 
distance divided by the total time taken to make the trip, 
including time spent stationary at ports, border crossings, 
and other stops. 
Table 3. Time and costs associated with transport 
within Sudan 
 
Route  Mode of transport   Time (days)  Implicit velocity 
Khartoum– 
Malakal  Road and river  7  4.7 
 Khartoum–
Juba  
Road  5  6.7 
Road and river  13.5  6.3 
Road  7.5  11.4 
Source: AICD calculations based on data from Yoshino and others (2009), UNJLC 
and FAO (2005), and Keer- MISC (2007). SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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rainy season, are often unavailable. Relying on other forms of transport does not solve the problem: river 
transport services are not well developed, ports are inadequate, and commercial vessels are old. Freight 
that has to move via river takes six days longer than if it were to travel only by road (table 3). Services are 
limited between Juba and Kosti, and are used mainly for transporting goods arriving by train in Port 
Sudan.  
The cost of moving freight in Sudan is almost twice what it is on other continents, though it compares 
with the average for Africa. The average freight tariff between Khartoum and Port Sudan is about $0.08 
per tonne-kilometer (tonne-km), and between Khartoum and Kosti is slightly higher, an average of $0.10 
per tonne-km. These prices are comparable to that of East Africa but much higher than the global standard 
of around $0.04 per tonne-km. 
The middle-of-the-range costs of moving freight—relative to the African average—are driven by the 
competitiveness of the trucking industry and access to lower-priced petroleum. In Sudan the trucking 
industry appears competitive, with few barriers to entry. Growth in the trucking fleet was steady during 
2004–06: 10 percent annually for lorries, 20 percent for tank trucks, and over 40 percent for dry-cargo 
heavy trucks. Additionally, the trucking sector is not cartelized as it is in West and Central Africa. 
Absence of cartels keeps profit margins reasonable without significant markups. Further, the low cost of 
petroleum, oil, and lubricants in Sudan—50 percent lower than the regional aggregate—helps maintain 
reasonable prices.  
Trucks travelling to South Sudan, however, may encounter various transport bottlenecks that increase 
costs. For example, one truck transporting sacks of onions from Kassala to Malakal was subject to taxes 
and fee payments at about 20 different locations, totaling 2,000 SDG ($800) (Yoshino 2009). Similar 
payments have not been reported while travelling within Sudan. 
Moving freight in Sudan is 
constrained by inadequate infrastructure 
and high costs. Comparing the 
competitiveness of Sudan’s main trading 
artery (Port Sudan to Kosti) with Africa’s 
best-performing corridor (the North-South 
corridor) reveals that there are 
significantly more costs and longer delays 
associated with moving along Sudan’s 
arteries (figures 6 and 7). Moving freight 
within Sudan takes longer than moving 
imports from Durban to Lusaka—a route 
across three countries that is 800 km 
longer. 
Transit times can be broken down into four components: the travel times of moving goods, that is, the 
time of travel based on the effective velocity along each corridor; administrative time spent importing 
goods to a country; port time, that is, the time taken to clear goods at ports; and border time, that is, the 
delays incurred in crossing borders. Transport costs are based on unit costs of moving freight along 
Figure 6. Moving freight within Sudan vs. moving imports from 
Durban to Lusaka 
 
Source: AICD calculations based on Nathan (2010); UNLJC and FAO (2005), 
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specific corridors, whereas administrative costs are based on costs involved in transporting imports into a 
country. Port and border delays were quantified into costs based on the assumption that delays cost $5 per 
day per tonne of imports. 
Port-related delays 
are the primary reason 
why it takes 18 days 
longer to move freight 
from Port Sudan to 
Kosti than from 
Durban to Lusaka, a 
route that is 800 km 
longer and spans three 
countries. The time 
required to move 
freight within Sudan 
does not include 
border-related delays 
or customs clearance processes that imports or exports to another country would require. The main cause 
of the delays within Sudan are the extremely long wait times by vessels for a berth and long dwell times 
in Port Sudan. Durban, one of the most efficient ports in Africa, records far fewer delays. 
In addition to the long delays, it costs more to move freight from Port Sudan to Kosti than it does to 
import freight to Lusaka from Durban. The extremely high costs posed by Port Sudan are reflected in the 
total cost required to move freight. Moving freight within Sudan is also much more difficult than across 
southern Africa (table 2). It is striking that even though imported freight to Zambia is subject to various 
customs fees and border delays, it is still cheaper overall.  
Figure 7. Expense of moving freight within Sudan and across southern Africa 
 





















































Figure 8. Road quality in Sudan 
  
Source: AICD 
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Despite the road network’s expansion since the advent of the oil industry, Sudan’s performance in the 
road sector lags regional aggregates. Between 2000 and 2008, the length of roads almost doubled from 
3,400 km to over 6,200 km. The network expansion involved major arterial routes that connect Khartoum 
with Port Sudan and onward to Egypt (Berger Group and Doshi Borgan & Partners 2010). While these 
north-south links are developed and in relatively good condition, east-west connectivity lags behind (see 
figure 8). Sudan has extremely low road densities and poor paving rates; a significant segment of the road 
network is in poor condition. The classified road network in Sudan is around 30 percent the size of what 
is prevalent in low-income countries and resource-rich countries, and traffic volumes are extremely low. 
Figure 9 indicates that a bulk of the traffic is concentrated in the northeastern part of the country, mainly 
from Khartoum to Port Sudan and Khartoum to the Red Sea. These low traffic volumes raise questions 
about the extent to which roads in Sudan meet traffic thresholds that justify paving. SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Table 4. Benchmarking the performance of Sudan’s roads 
Indicator  Unit  Sudan 
Low-
income 






Classified road density  km/1,000 km2 of arable land area  37  88  101  278  57 
Paving ratio  % of primary network paved  47  71.6     32  82.1 
Paved road traffic  AADT (vehicles per day)  369  1,341  1,549  3,798  1,408 
Unpaved road traffic  AADT (vehicles per day)  13  39  47  75  54 
Classified network 
condition  Percentage in good or fair condition  26  86  59     80 
Paved network condition  % of paved roads in good or fair condition  24  86  79  82  68 
Unpaved network 
condition  % of unpaved roads in good or fair condition  0  56     58  61 
Source: Derived from AICD calculations. 
Note: The paving ratio for Sudan is calculated based on the classified road network that is paved. The paved network condition in Sudan is based on 
regional and national roads in Sudan. The paved road network for Sudan does not include roads of fair quality because the length of roads with fair 
quality is unknown. AADT = average annual daily traffic. 
 
Table 5a. Land area in Sudan with high agricultural suitability 
Percent contribution to aggregate agriculture value  South Sudan  Sudan 
All parts of 
Sudan 
< 10% but high suitability  4,381  1,438  5,819 
10%–50%  2,279  4,793  7,072 
> 50%  54  265  319 
Total area of high agricultural suitability  6,714  6,496  13,210 
 
Table 5b. Distribution of agricultural value within Sudan 
Percent contribution to aggregate agriculture value  South Sudan  Sudan 
All parts of 
Sudan 
< 10% but high suitability  65  22  44 
10%–50%  34  74  54 
> 50%  1  4  2 
Total area of high agricultural suitability  100  100  100 
Source: AICD calculations.       
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The poor quality of roads in Sudan significantly lowers the efficiency of transport services. The poor 
maintenance and need for overlay in Sudan are due to inadequate funding for road maintenance and the 
lack of cost recovery along existing roads. The net result is a rapid deterioration of the quality of existing 
roads. The revenue collected by the National Highway Authority from tolls covers only 100 km of 
overlay and rehabilitation per year. In addition, a backlog of preventive maintenance needs has 
accumulated, to the extent that between 400 and 500 km of rehabilitation and overlay per year would now 
be required. Inadequate enforcement of restrictions on axle loads is further accelerating road deterioration 
(World Bank 2009a).  
Agricultural land is very lightly used in Sudan, in part due to inadequate roads. Sizable parts of 
economically productive areas in Sudan are isolated from the markets. Development of roads is a 
necessary precondition to exploiting the agricultural potential of Sudan. Sudan has roughly 650,000 
square kilometers (km
2) of land (table 5a) with high agricultural potential, but 75 percent of it is farmed at 
only 10 to 50 percent of its capacity. Around a quarter of the land that has high suitability is farmed at 
only 10 percent of its capacity (tables 5a and 5b). 
Transport spending needs can be estimated based on the assumption that key economic nodes need to 
be connected. It is estimated that Sudan needs 2,900 km of road to meet regional connectivity standards 
(linking Khartoum to international frontiers); 5,300 km to meet national connectivity standards (linking 
all provincial capitals to the regional network); and a further 34,201 km to meet rural connectivity 
standards (linking land responsible for 80 percent of existing agricultural production value to the national 
network as well as linking land with the capability of producing 50 percent of the nonrealized agricultural 
value). In addition, the urban connectivity standard assumes an extension of the paved road network to 
within 500 meters of the population.  
Two scenarios are considered. In the base scenario, all infrastructure is maintained in good condition, 
and higher-end surfacing options are used (asphalt for all regional, national, and urban roads and single-
surface treatment for rural roads). In the pragmatic scenario, half the infrastructure is maintained in good 
condition and half in fair condition, and lower-cost surfacing options are used (single-surface treatment 
for national and urban roads and gravel for rural roads). 
An initial estimation of the connectivity needs suggests that sizable spending requirements—$750 
million to $1 billion—are needed to reach the goals outlined in either scenario. The largest components of 
this total are attributed to improving conditions of existing roads and expansion of capacity. Once basic 
connectivity goals have been reached, an ongoing road sector maintenance budget of at least $400 million 
per year would be required to expand the network, and an additional $390 million would be required to 
sustain the network. In the pragmatic scenario, while the standards for new developments and upgrading 
are relaxed, emphasis on maintenance is sustained. 
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Table 6. Sudan’s spending needs for regional, national, rural, and urban connectivity 
  
Road length in good condition 
(km)  Spending needs ($ million per year over a 10-year period) 
As share  






condition  Maintenance  Total 
   Basic scenario 
National  874  5,372  0  213  23  123  360  1.7 
Regional  2,010  2,893  189  84  38  129  440  2.1 
UAI  50  4,226  222  20  5  15  262  1.2 
RAI  —  34,201  0  310  33  122  466  2.2 
Total  2934  46,692  411  627  99  390  1,528  7.2 
Pragmatic scenario 
National  874  5,372  0  160  3  119  282  1.3 
Regional  2,010  2,893  113  33  4  117  268  1.3 
UAI  50  1,839  63  17  5  15  100  0.5 
RAI    34,201  0  116  2  258  376  1.8 
Total  2,934  44,305  176  326  13  509  1,025  4.8 
Source: Adapted from Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray (2009). 
Note: RAI = Rural Accessibility Index ; UAI = Urban Accessibility Index  
Ports 
Achievements 
The Sudanese Port Authority (SPC) 
has used its large revenues to invest in 
infrastructure improvements at Port 
Sudan. The SPC revenue per ton of 
throughput increased by 47 percent in 
dollar terms between 2000 and 2005. A 
combination of a higher realization per 
tonne handled and large increases in 
throughput has led to the generation of 
substantial surpluses. Information from 
the mid-2000s suggests that the SPC 
invested around $187 million in 
development projects. This resulted in the 
main areas being in good condition with a 
number of new berths added and infrastructure projects commissioned. The SPC enjoys a monopoly in its 
role as the country’s main node for maritime trade, and its revenues appear high relative to the number of 
ships using the port and the volume of cargo it handles (World Bank 2008). 
Figure 10. Port Sudan faces serious congestion problems 
 

















































































































Port Sudan remains one of the most inefficient ports in Africa. Compared to regional benchmarks, 
container dwell time at Port Sudan is over four times that of global best practices and among the worst in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Truck cycle times for receipt and delivery of cargo at Port Sudan are 24 times higher 
than global benchmarks, and crane productivity is less than a third of what is observed in several parts of 
Africa. The handling charges at Port Sudan are at the lower end of what is charged in other African ports, 
but the inefficiencies present a huge deterrent to increased usage of the port (table 7). 
Table 7. Benchmarking Port Sudan’s performance 
  Port Sudan  Mombasa  Dar es Salaam 
Southern 
Africa  West Africa 
Global best 
practice 
Performance                   
Container dwell time (days)  28  5  7  4–8  11–30  <7 
Truck processing time (hours)  24  4.5  5  2–12  6–24  1 
Crane productivity (containers per 
hour)  8  10  20  8–22  7–20  20–30 
Crane productivity (tonnes per hour)  8  21  23  10–25  7–15  >30 
Charges                   
Container handling ($ per TEU)  150  67.5  275  110–243  100–320  80–150 
General-cargo handling ($ per tonne)  10  6.5  13.5  11–15  8–15  7–9 
Container handling ($ per TEU)  -130  -54.5  -248  110–244  100–321  80–151 
Source: AICD ports database. 
Note: TEU = 20-foot equivalent unit. 
 
A steady increase in containers handled at Port Sudan has created serious port congestion problems, 
adding significant delays to the movement of freight. Several of the region’s ports are beginning to 
experience serious capacity constraints (figure 10) due to burgeoning demand associated with increases in 
container traffic and dry-bulk cargo. Port Sudan in particular is already operating at 80 percent capacity at 
least, a level of intensity that creates problems in terms of congestion. There is some scope for easing 
capacity constraints by improving the efficiency of port performance, although ultimately new 
investments will be needed (see figure 10). 
Labor requirements at the port lead to overstaffing, poor productivity, and higher costs. In the North 
Port, the equivalent of a dock labor board exists and there is a legal requirement to use labor from a pool 
of 25,000 workers. In the container terminal, the SPC provides the labor and acknowledges that it is 








Sudan’s per capita airline seat capacity is higher than that of most of its neighbors, excluding Kenya 
and Egypt (which have their own exceptionally strong national carriers). Sudan has developed a strong 
international gateway for air transport in Khartoum. Overall traffic in Sudan has risen, largely driven by 
intercontinental traffic. Consistent with the rest of Africa, the overall size of the aircraft flown has 
decreased from wide-body to single-aisle jets. 
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Growth in seats for travel between Sudan and South Sudan tripled between 2001 and 2007. The Diio 
SRS shows that in 2007, while there were 219,741 seats for travel within Sudan, there were only 696 
seats advertised for South Sudan (table 8) These figures may mask the fact that traffic between the two 
regions has actually grown rather significantly—from 24,452 seats in 2001 to 87,191 in 2007. How much 
of that traffic is hub traffic through Khartoum traveling between points in South Sudan is not known. 
Table 8. Benchmarking air transport indicators for Sudan and select other countries4 
Country  Sudan  Ethiopia  Chad  CAR  Kenya  Egypt 
Traffic (2007)             
Domestic travel (‘000 seats per year, excluding south)  218  729  n.a.  n.a.  2,093  5,959 
International travel within Africa (‘000 seats per year)  302  1,837  110  21  3,145  1,886 
Intercontinental travel (‘000 seats per year)  2,052  2,005  89  24  2,755  15,793 
Seats available per 100 people  9.8  5.8  1.8  1  21  27.5 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index—air transport market (%)  15.29  70.61  36.35  50.26  39.47  24 
Quality             
Percent of seat-km in newer aircraft  71.9  98.5  99.5  100  80.2  90.7 
Percent of seat-km in medium or smaller aircraft  72  39.7  93.6  23.5  20.8  51.2 
Percent of carriers passing IATA/IOSA audit  0  100  0  0  11.1  50 
FAA/IASA audit status  No audit  Passed  No audit  0  0  Passed 
Source: Bofinger  2009. 
Note: The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the 
market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. A HHI of 100 indicates the market is a monopoly; 
the lower the HHI, the more diluted the market power exerted by one company/agent. 
FAA = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration; IASA = International Aviation Safety Assessment; IATA = International Air Transport Association; 
IOSA = IATA International Safety Audit; CAR = Central African Republic. 
n.a. = Not applicable. 
Challenges 
Existing air connectivity in Sudan is largely oriented toward the Middle East and Egypt. Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia) is used as the main connecting point to transit to the rest of Africa, while Sudan has, for 
example, no direct flights from Khartoum to Kampala (table 9).  
There is a lack of regulatory oversight in the air transport sector.  A number of small, domestic 
carriers, registered generally as charter airlines, are operational. These operators may act as scheduled 
carriers, but do not report information to a booking or ticket sales agency. Often such operators in 
countries with poor oversight pose an air safety problem as they operate aircraft maintained on minimal 
budgets, with maintenance crew and pilots whose skills may not be consistent with international 
standards. The percentage of seats in Sudan flown on newer aircraft is smaller than its neighbors, creating 
additional safety risks. 
                                                 
4 All data are as of 2007 based on estimations and computations of scheduled advertised seats, as published by the 
Diio SRS Analyzer. This captures 98 percent of worldwide traffic, but a percentage of African traffic is not captured 
by these data.  SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Bahrain                                10                      
Egypt                                38                      
Eritrea                                1                      
Ethiopia                                10                      
Germany                                4                      
Jordan                                6                      
Kenya                                14                      
Lebanon                                3                      
Libya                                2                      
Netherlands                                3                      
Sudan  10  38  1  10  4  6  13  3  2  3     15  17  2  7  29  3  2 
Qatar                                14                      
Saudi Arabia                                17                      
Syrian Arab 
Republic                                4                      
Turkey                                7                      
United Arab 
Emirates                                29                      
United Kingdom                                3                      
Yemen                                2                      
Source: Bofinger 2009. 
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Figure 12. Evolution of seats and city pairs in Sudan 
a. Seats  b. City pairs 
   
Source: Bofinger 2009. Derived from AICD national database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: As reported to international reservation systems. 
NA = North Africa; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Water supply and sanitation 
Challenges 
Around 85 percent of Sudan’s populace lacks access to safe sources of water (figure 13). Over 25 
percent of the population relies on surface water and almost 60 percent relies on wells and boreholes. 
Sudan’s reliance on wells and boreholes for water supply is higher than for any other country in its peer 
groups and is becoming a challenge for the country. Fewer than half the wells and boreholes in Africa 
provide safe water (table 10).  
Sanitation access in Sudan is bimodal. On the one hand, 40 percent of the population has access to 
improved latrines; on the other, 40 percent continues to practice open defecation. Both ratios are 
substantially higher than for the relevant resource-rich and low-income African peer groups. In contrast to 
these peers, reliance on flush toilets and traditional latrines is much more limited. 
A very small share of the population—15 percent—has access to utility water, well below all other 
African benchmarks. Available information suggests that there is almost no access to piped water, and 
stand posts are the only form of utility water that is accessed. Census data for all parts of Sudan indicate 
that in 1993 about 60 percent of the population had access to utility water but there has been a steep 
decline in access rates—down to 35 percent—in the 2000s. Since access to utility water is negligible in 
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The precarious decline in access has been attributed to a lack of maintenance of water supply assets that 
has led to their gradual dilapidation. 




Table 10. Benchmarking water and sanitation indicators in Sudan
5 







     2009  Mid-2000s  Mid-2000s  Mid-2000s 
Access to piped water  % pop  —  13  9.3  61 
Access to stand posts  % pop  15  12  17.1  22 
Access to wells/boreholes  % pop  58  47  39.3  5 
Access to surface water  % pop  27  27  34.2  11 
Access to flush toilets/septic tanks  % pop  5  13  4.7  48 
Access to improved latrines  % pop  41  37  18.3  34 
Access to traditional latrines  % pop  11  22  38.5  7 
                                                 
5 The AICD used the March 2010 Joint Monitoring Data (JMP) coverage statistics as the main source of access data 
on water supply and sanitation, and processed it under a standardized methodology to allow cross-country 
comparisons. The AICD calculations might differ from the access rates reported by governments. SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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     2009  Mid-2000s  Mid-2000s  Mid-2000s 
Open defecation  % pop  43  28  38.3  11 
      2005  Mid-2000s  Mid-2000s  Mid-2000s 
Domestic water consumption  liter/capita/day  53  115  50.9  196 
Revenue collection  % sales  64  60  94.1  99 
Distribution losses  % production  40  40  34.8  29 
Cost recovery  % total costs  62  67  89.5  86 
Operating-cost recovery  % operating costs  86  94  125.2  121 
Labor productivity  connections per employee  93  96  175.9  203 
Total hidden costs   % of revenue   121  194     67 
   Scarce water 




Average effective tariff  U.S. cents per m3  60  57  3–60 
Source: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) and AICD water and sanitation utilities database 
(www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data).Note: Access figures calculated by the AICD based on the 2000 and 2006 DHS figures published 
by the Joint Monitoring Program (WHO 2010). 
— = Not available.  
 
Only 40 percent of urban dwellers rely on 
advanced water technologies for their water 
supply. Close to 40 percent of the population 
has access to utility water—mainly stand 
posts—in urban areas, and around 5 percent in 
rural areas. Almost 70 percent of rural Sudanese 
rely on wells and boreholes, 30 percent higher 
than in urban areas. It is very striking that there 
is little difference in the reliance on surface 
water—around 25 percent of both rural and 
urban Sudanese obtain their water from open 
sources.  
There is significantly greater usage of 
improved sanitation technology types in urban 
areas (figure 14). Urban areas have twice the 
level of access to flush toilets or improved 
latrines compared to rural areas. In the case of flush toilets, the access rate in urban areas is 14 percent 
compared to 1 percent in rural areas. Sixty percent of the urban population relies on improved latrines 
compared to 32 percent of the population in rural areas (figure 15). Some 68 percent of the rural 
population defecate in the open compared to 12 percent of urban dwellers. 
Deep boreholes and hand pumps are the predominant technology used for water supply in the poorer 
households, and water filters (improved sources of water) are the water supply modalities in wealthier 
households. Around 41 percent of the poorest quintile of  households derive their water from wells and 
Figure 14. Limited access to advanced water technologies in 
urban Sudan 
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boreholes, while 12 percent of the wealthiest quintile of households rely on water from wells and 
boreholes. 
Lower-income Sudanese use lower-end 
sanitation technologies. Around 54 percent of 
the poorest quintile of the population defecates 
in the open compared to 13 percent of the 
richest quintile. While none of the poorest 
quintile of the population uses flush toilets, 
almost 20 percent of the richest quintile do so. 
The most dominant sanitation technology across 
the board is pit toilets. Disparities are less 
glaring in the use of pit toilets—around 42 
percent of the poorest quintile of the population 
and 56 percent of the richest quintile of the 
population use them.  
The KWC’s poor performance, particularly 
due to inadequate collection of bills and network 
losses, also holds back service expansion. The 
KWC fares poorly when its performance is compared to regional benchmarks. Nonrevenue water, at 40 
percent of production, is twice that of a well-performing utility. At 90 connections per employee, labor 
productivity is less than half the average productivity of a utility in middle-income countries, which is 
200 connections per employee. On average, Sudan’s water utilities recover only 62 percent of the total 
billing, which is comparable to the revenue collection of utilities in resource-rich countries, but is a very 
poor track record in absolute terms. Finally, cost-recovery tariffs are not in place, creating a constant 
financial drain.  
The poor performance can be quantified as a percentage of revenue, giving a sense of the hidden costs 
attached to such inefficiencies. Sufficient data were available to quantify these hidden costs for the KWC 
as well for one other provincial utility in Sudan: the South Darfur Water Corporation. The KWC emerges 
at the more inefficient of the two. Overall, the utilities lose between 80 and 120 percent of their revenues. 
The main drivers of these losses are collection inefficiencies, followed by distributional losses. The 
inefficiencies in Sudan’s utilities are slightly lower than several East African countries (Kenya and 
Ethiopia) that lose up to 150 percent of their revenues due to hidden costs (figure 16), but are still very 
high in absolute terms, amounting to $73 million a year. 
Figure 15. Sanitation access is largely bimodal 
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Figure 16. Hidden costs of selected water utilities, as percentage of revenue 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
 
The valuation of these hidden costs helps identify the individual challenges faced by Sudanese 
utilities. Collection inefficiencies are leading concerns for the South Darfur Water Corporation and the 
Khartoum Water Corporation. The underlying observable performance indicators are presented in 
table 11.  























Khartoum Water Corp  250  40  62  0.68  0.59  73  122 
South Darfur Water Corp  7  49  49  0.89  1.13  3  87 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
Note: For Sudan water delivered (million m3/year) and total hidden costs ($/year) are reported as the sum of the utilities; the other indicators are 
calculated as weighted averages. Average total cost per cubic meter was calculated assuming a unit capital cost of 40 cents. 
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Installed electricity generation capacity in 
Sudan tripled between 2005 and 2007. Sudan’s 
installed capacity increased from 801 MW (AICD 
2005) in 2005 to around 2,687 MW in 2009 
(Platts 2009).
6 Compared to its African peers, 
Sudan’s installed capacity far exceeds what low-
income countries have put in place but lags 
behind that of resource-rich countries. In 2005 
around 70 percent of the electricity was generated 
via thermal generation and around 20 percent 
using hydropower resources. But the composition 
mix seems to have changed since 2005; with the 
construction of new hydropower plants, the 
generation mix has now shifted to 55 percent 
hydropower and 45 percent thermal. 
The National Energy Corporation (NEC) enjoys healthy bill collection. The utility reports that all of 
the billings are routinely collected by the utility. These rates are higher than all other African peer groups 
(table 13).  
Sudan boasts a relatively high use of modern fuels (gas and electricity) for cooking relative to its 
African peers. Around 36 percent of Sudan’s population uses modern fuels for cooking compared to 1 
percent of resource-rich Nigeria’s population. Over 65 percent of Sudan’s richest quintile use modern 
fuels for cooking relative to 6 percent in Nigeria and 16 percent in Kenya (see table 12). Even 8 percent 
of the poorest quintile of the population used modern fuels. 
Challenges 
Electricity access rates, at around 37 percent of the population, are still low relative to most of 
Sudan’s resource-rich peers. The figure is more or less comparable to that of African low-income 
countries, however. Over 52 percent of urban areas have access to electricity compared to 28 percent of 
rural areas. Rural electrification is broadly comparable with other parts of Africa, but urban electrification 
lags significantly. There is a difference of over 25 percentage points between access to power in urban 
areas in Sudan and in other resource-rich countries in Africa. 
Inadequate power access retards business activity, with the challenge being more acute in some 
areas than others. Though firms reporting that power is not widely available varied from 25 to 60 
percent, state to state, across all states firms identified power to be a major problem. This 
challenge is particularly acute in the Nyala region, where around 60 percent of firms say 
inadequate power constrains business activity (figure 18a). Power outages in Sudan, at 19 days 
per year, greatly impact productive activity and exceed those found among the country’s 
resource-rich and low-income peers. 
                                                 
6 Based on the estimate that around 97 percent of all parts of Sudan’s power is in Sudan. 
Table 12. Relatively high usage of modern fuels for cooking 
in Sudan  
Usage of modern fuels 
   All households  Richest households 
Sudan (2009)  36.10  64.90 
Kenya (2003)  3.45  16.52 
Nigeria (2003)  1.19  5.51 
Uganda (2001)  0.87  4.34 
Ethiopia (2005)  0.31  1.48 
South Sudan (2009)  0.30  0.80 
Tanzania (2005)  0.24  1.22 
Source: World Bank 2010b and c DHS various years. SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Table 13. Benchmarking power indicators in Sudan 










Access to electricity (national)  % of population   36.5  33  50  46 
Access to electricity (urban)  % of population  52  86  72.8  79.4 
Access to electricity (rural)  % of population   28  12.7   26.3   28  
Installed generation capacity  MW  2,712  651  36,971  4,105 
Installed generation capacity per 
million population  MW per million population  80  20  799  43 
Power outages   Days/year     10.4    5.9   14.5 
Firms that find power a constraint for 
business  % of firms     52  31  56 
Firms with own generator  % of firms  41  41  18  63 
Collection rate  % billing  100  92  91  70 
Revenue per unit  US cents/ kWh  9  14  13  13 
System losses  % of generation  22  24  20  52 
Effective power tariff    Sudan  Predominantly hydro 
Other 
countries 
Residential at 100 kWh  US cents/kWh  0.09  10.27 
5.0–10.0  Commercial at 100 kWh  US cents/kWh     11.73 
Industrial at 50,000 kWh  US cents/kWh     11.39 
Average effective tariff  US cents/kWh  9  8   15  12.6 
Source: All data unless specified are for 2005 and based on AICD calculations; data for access to electricity for Sudan are from 2009 and were 
obtained from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA); data for South Sudan access to electricity are from 2010 and were obtained 
from World Bank (2011); data for installed capacity for Sudan are from 2009 and were obtained from Platts (2009); data for power outages ere 
derived from Vennemo and Rosnes (2009); data for Emergency Generation from Eberhard and others (2008); data for firms that find power to 
be a constraint and firms with own generators are from 2007 and were obtained from World Bank (2009b); data on Sudan collection rate, 
revenue per unit, and system losses are for 2004 and were taken from World Bank (2007); data for average effective tariff for Sudan are for 
2004 and taken from World Bank (2007); data for average effective tariff for South Sudan are taken from World Bank (2011). For the thermal 
benchmark, data represent primarily residential users. 
Note: Access to electricity data for Sudan are estimates based on calculations from the AICD economic model for power investment needs. 
Installed capacity per million population was calculated based on Platts (2009) estimates for installed capacity. 
* The aggregate is based on manufacturing firms. 
 
Excessive reliance on generators to cope with erratic and unreliable power supply increases 
production costs and reduces competitiveness. A significant share of manufacturing enterprises (from 36 
percent in North Kordofan to 96 percent in Red Sea) share or own generators. The share of electricity 
consumption produced by generators in these states was 66 percent and 72 percent, respectively. Apart 
from increasing costs and reducing competitiveness, investment in these generators also holds up a 
significant amount of resources that could have been used for other fixed assets or to lower working 
capital constraints of most of the businesses (World Bank 2009b). Given erratic supply and high reliance 
on backup generators, industrial and commercial consumers account for only around 30 percent of 
electric utility consumption (figure 19). Consumption of power for agricultural uses is around 5 percent, 
and the rest of the consumption is primarily by domestic consumers. In contrast, billing patterns (as a 
proxy for consumption) in South Africa suggest that industrial and commercial consumers account for 92 
percent of all billings, and residential consumers for only 8 percent. SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 18a. Electricity is the largest obstacle to doing 
business in Sudan 
Figure 18b. High reliance on generators for power  
 Source: Derived from World Bank (2009b). 
 
 
Figure 19. A small share of Sudan’s power consumption is for industrial activities 
Source: Based on statistical handbooks produced by the Central Bureau of Statistics and on data reported by the NEC, which are assumed to 
reflect the situation in Sudan. 
 
Power prices are toward the lower-middle end of the range observed in Sub-Saharan Africa. At $0.09 
per kilowatt-hour (kWh), the price is close to the average of countries predominantly reliant on 
hydropower. Nevertheless, given that thermal power has been dominant until quite recently and continues 
to play a significant role, tariffs look low relative to historic costs of around $0.19/kWh (figure 20). 
The costs of producing power are marginally higher than the average cost of power production in 
Africa. The average power production cost in Sudan, at $0.19/kWh, is slightly more than that of Sub-
Saharan Africa’s, which is around $0.18/kWh (figure 21). The costs are partially offset by generous 
government subsidies to the power utility. In 2003 and 2004 the government of Sudan provided subsidies 
valued at around $60 million. While there are no data available for later years, it is believed that the 
power utility continues to receive these subsides from the government. The end user ultimately pays less 
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Figure 20. Moderate power tariffs in Sudan 
 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan 2009; World Bank 2007; World Bank 2011. 
Note: South Sudan’s price is the median of its price range of 18–29 cents. 
DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
Figure 21. Benchmarking historic power production costs in Sudan 
 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan 2009; World Bank 2007; World Bank 2011. 
Note: DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
In spite of the generous subsidies received from the government, the NEC reported large financial 
losses. The utility lost $12 million each year in 2003 and 2004, $0.02–$0.03 per unit of electricity sold. 
Even the 10 percent increase in power sales from the previous year did not stabilize the financial 
performance of the NEC. 
Hidden costs diverted significant resources from the utility, causing economic losses of almost $500 
million ($484 million) in 2008 Underpricing is one major problem—the $0.09 per kilowatt-hour tariff 
recovers only 50 percent of the $0.18 required to produce a kilowatt-hour. Despite subsidization, this 
underpricing added almost $380 million to the NEC’s 2008 losses.  
Network losses were around 22 percent in 2008. Though generally consistent with what most African 
utilities encounter, losses of this magnitude are double international best-practice standards. Network 
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   (GWh/year)  (%)  (%)  ($/kWh)  ($/kWh)  ($ million/year)  (% revenues) 
2003  3,560  34.8  100  0.16  0.08  306  175 
2004  3,749  33.4  100  0.16  0.09  293  129 
2005  4,124  26  100  —  —  _  — 
2006  4,521  24  100  0.16  0.092  340  96 
2007  5,021  22  100  0.20  0.092  528  113 
2008  5,506  22  100  0.19  0.098  484  96 
Source: AICD analysis based on World Bank (2007) and Sudan Central Bureau of Statistical Handbooks. 
— = Not available. 
 
Some progress has been made, however. Hidden costs as a share of utility revenue fell substantially 
from 175 percent of NEC’s revenues in 2003 to 96 percent in 2008 (figure 22). This is largely attributable 
to significant reduction in network losses, which were as high as 35 percent in 2003 but were reduced to 
22 percent by 2008. While tariffs have risen slightly, they have not kept pace with the rising costs of 
production Nevertheless, a 60 percent expansion of power production all sold at a loss, has inflated 
absolute hidden costs from $306 million in 2003 to $484 million in 2008 Expressed in terms of the size of 
the economy, these hidden costs shaved off 2.2 percent of GDP in 2003, falling to 1.5 percent of GDP in 
2008. 
Figure 22. Large hidden costs at the NEC due to underpricing and unaccounted losses 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009) using data from World Bank (2007) and Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics 
handbooks. 
 
The NEC’s hidden costs look high when compared to that of other African utilities (figure 23). They 
represent about 100 percent of the NEC’s revenues and are double that of the top-performing countries 
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Figure 23. Hidden costs are high in Sudan relative to other African countries  
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009); Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics handbooks. 
 
In the long run, Sudan’s power cost-recovery situation looks a little more promising, particularly if 
the nation’s hydropower potential is developed. Using a model that simulates optimal (least-cost) 
strategies for generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity in response to demand increases, it is 
estimated that the long-run marginal costs of producing power in Sudan would be about $0.13/kWh when 
all cost-effective power strategies are fully developed. Although this is well below the historic cost of 
around $0.19/kWh, it is still significantly above the current tariff of $0.09/kWh. Thus, there is a need to 
continue raising the tariff toward these long-term equilibrium levels (figure 24). 
 
Figure 24. Existing tariffs for power are insufficient to recover huge operating costs and long-run marginal costs 
 
Source: AICD calculations. 
 
Sudan’s rich endowment of hydropower resources could make it a significant exporter of hydropower 
in the Nile Basin region. To meet its potential, Sudan would need to develop more than 3,100 MW of 
hydropower capacity beyond its domestic needs, which would represent a doubling of capacity. The 
nation would also need to develop around 13,500 MW of interconnector capacity, the largest of any 
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Deepening power trade would save the Eastern Africa Power Pool–Nile Basin (EAPP-NB) around 
$1 billion in energy costs. Even though Sudan and Ethiopia have to make the lion’s share of the 
investments, these will offset the high costs of thermal generation, which is currently the main source of 
generation in the EAPP. Expanding capacity and investing in interconnectors will allow Sudan to gain a 
substantial 12 percent per year return on the investment. Moreover, by increasing the share of hydropower 
in the regional generation portfolio, the region could save several million tonnes of carbon emissions a 
year. Under trade expansion, Sudan’s weight of hydropower increased from 73 to 87 percent, making the 
generation of power less carbon intensive. 
Information and communication technology 
Figure 25. Sudan’s ICT backbone infrastructure as of the mid-2000s 
 
Source: AICD. 
Note: The figure captures the situation in Sudan in the mid-2000s, when the mobile signal coverage was not as high. Today, this situation has 




All parts of Sudan have made impressive progress in the ICT sector since the early 2000s, placing 
access and service penetration rates on par with African peers. In the early 2000s, only around 60 percent 
of the population was covered by a GSM
7 signal. As of 2010, over 80 percent of the population is covered 
by a GSM signal. Mobile subscription rates have risen from less than 1 percent in 2000 to 33 percent in 
2009. Growth in mobile telephony has been impressive and Sudan’s is among the most rapidly growing in 
Africa. Until recently, most of the development in the sector was in the northern part of Sudan .Only a 
few other countries in East Africa—Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda—have achieved mobile penetration of 
around 20 percent or more. Internet penetration has also grown significantly but slightly lags behind 
resource-rich and middle-income African countries. International bandwidth in all parts of Sudan has 
grown exponentially and exceeds all benchmarks except middle-income countries. The landline sector has 
not demonstrated much growth, meanwhile, in part because of an overwhelming preference for mobile 
phones. This trend is broadly consistent across Africa as a whole. 
Table 15. All parts of Sudan compare favorably to the average African country in terms of ICT access and prices 
Indicator  Unit 













2000  2008  2008  2008  2008  2008 
Access                      
GSM coverage 
% population under 
signal  60  80  78  63  96   72 
International bandwidth  Bits/person  0.06  35  18  25   209  39 
Internet  Users/100 people  0.1  5.9  9  3.5   7  5.5 
Landline  Subscribers/100 people  1.2  1.09  0.9  0.8   9.2  1.4 
Mobile phone  Subscribers/100 people  0.05  33  38.2  24.4   95.3  33.1 
Prices     2008  2009  2008  2008  2008  2008 
Price of monthly mobile basket  US $  4.8  3  17.07  11  9.24  12.06 
Price of monthly fixed-line basket  US $  4.4  5.3  15.12  10.43  11.41  12.38 
Price of monthly fixed broadband   US $  47  25  231.98  286.72  57.42  208.71 
Price of a call to the United States per minute  US $    0.42  0.92  0.69  0.56  0.7 
Price of an inter-Africa call per minute  US $    0.42  1.16  0.94  1.06  0.99 
Source: Adapted from Minges and others 2009 using data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, Sudatel, Zain, and World Bank ICT At-a-
Glance. 
Source: Data for landline subscribers is for 2005 taken from the Central Bureau of Statistics, South Sudan; Mobile phone subscriptions based 
on World Bank staff estimates for 2011; Note: Landline and mobile subscriber data are based on information from Sudan; the others are based 
on Sudan aggregates. These are representative of Sudan because until recently South Sudan did not have access to adequate ICT services. 
Most of the ICT connectivity existed only in Sudan. 
 
Analysis of 2006 data for all parts of Sudan suggests that almost 98 percent of the population could 
access mobile telephony on a commercially viable basis (figure 26). This result is based on the 
assumption that 4 percent of local income in each area could be captured as revenue for voice telephony 
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services. The gap in universal access to telephony can be closed relatively easily for Sudan on a 
commercial basis. A small subsidy could aid in reaching the uncovered 2 percent of the population. 
For broadband infrastructure, simulations present an optimistic picture. Around 96 percent of all parts 
of Sudan’s population could gain access to limited performance WIMAX
8 broadband infrastructure on a 
commercially viable basis. A gap of 3 to 4 percent exists in the northwest region of all parts of Sudan—
primarily a desert—and in the south (figure 27) 
Figure 26. A small subsidy could have closed the mobile telephony coverage gap in all parts of Sudan 
Source: Mayer and others 2009. 
 
The advent of undersea fiber-optic cables has enabled Sudan to develop a strong ICT infrastructure 
backbone (figure 26). Three undersea cable systems land in Port Sudan: SAS-1 (providing a direct link to 
Saudi Arabia), Flag Falcon, and, most recently, the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EASSy). In 
addition, there are terrestrial links to Egypt and Ethiopia and a 10,000 km domestic fiber backbone 
(Sudatel 2009). The EASSy has established a landing station in Sudan. Significant private investment has 
facilitated Sudan’s fiber-optic connectivity. Sudan needs to establish overland connections to the cable to 
complete the national ICT backbone 
The emergence of competition in gateways as a result of connectivity to the undersea cable has 
facilitated very attractive prices for ICT services in Sudan—among the most attractive in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Sudan pays a third of what resource-rich countries pay and a fourth of what low-income countries 
pay for the mobile basket. Landline telephony, which has not experienced any growth, has also seen its 
prices slashed. But prices for fixed broadband are the most striking. In 2005 all parts of Sudan paid 10 
percent of what resource-rich countries paid for their ICT services and 8 percent of what low-income 
countries paid (table 15). 
                                                 








































































































































































Existing access  Efficient Market Gap Coverage gapSUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 37 
Figure 27. The voice telephony gap could easily have been filled in Sudan 
 
 
Source: Mayer and others 2009. 
 
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa suggests that access to the submarine cable has generally reduced 
costs of ICT services when international gateways are present (table 16). Sudan has established 
competition in its international data gateways and partial competition in its international long-distance 
gateway. The pricing of ICT services, particularly Internet-access prices, reflects the emergence of 
competitive gateways (table 15). Prices to call within the region are consistent with those of other 
countries that have established competition in international long distance, and are half what resource-rich 
and low-income countries pay in general. Prices to call the United States are half what low-income and 
resource-rich countries pay on average (table 15), but are double those of countries that have established 
competitive gateways (table 16). 
Table 16. Prices of Internet and phone calls in Sub-Saharan Africa, with and without access to submarine cables 
$  Call within 
region 





Without submarine cable  1.34  0.86  68  283 
With submarine cable  0.57  0.48  47  111 
  Monopoly on international gateway  0.70  0.72  37  120 
  Competitive international gateway  0.48  0.23  37  98 
Source: AICD calculations. 
Note: ADSL = asymmetric digital subscriber line. 
 
Sudan has made impressive strides in liberalizing its ICT markets and now boasts one of the most 
liberalized markets in Africa. The original National Telecommunication Authority has been dissected into 
two core competencies. The National Telecommunication Corporation (NTC), the industry regulator, was 
established in 2001 and took on the function of regulation and supervision. The provision of ICT services 
was licensed to private operators. One operator, Sudatel, was established in 1994 as a public company and 
subsequently floated on the regional stock market. The government owns around 21 percent of the SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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company and the rest is owned by other private entities. Shares in Sudatel have been available to the 
public since 1997 and are traded on several Middle Eastern stock markets. Sudatel is also a strategic 
investor in its own right, with operations in Mauritania and Senegal as well as Ghana and Nigeria. Now 
there are two fixed-line operators (Sudatel and Canar) and three nationwide GSM mobile operators 
(Sudatel, MTN, and Zain), which also operate in South Sudan. 
By establishing a universal service fund, Sudan is garnering funds to expand service coverage to 
economically unviable rural areas. Effective from 2009, mobile network operators pay 2 percent of their 
gross revenues into a universal access fund, plus $0.87 per customer per year. Proceeds from the fund are 
expected to be used to subsidize rollouts in otherwise economically unfeasible rural areas (Lange 2010). 
Financing Sudan’s infrastructure 
To meet its most pressing needs, Sudan has to significantly improve infrastructure in key areas. For 
the purpose of this report, illustrative targets have been set using standardized criteria and assuming a 
time horizon of 10 years to meet the targets. For example, it is reasonable to assume that the water and 
sanitation Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can be attained using a mix of technological options. 
Similarly, targets for increasing electrification assume, at least, doubling the current access rates, which in 
one case implies reaching 55 percent of the population on average. In the case of transport, national 
connectivity involves connecting centers with populations larger than 25,000 people. This translates into a 
need for 5,372 km of road in good condition in the north (table 17). 
Table 17. Illustrative investment targets for infrastructure in Sudan 
Sector  Economic targets  Social targets 
ICT  Install fiber-optic links to neighboring capitals and submarine cable. 
Add 26,900 base stations for urban and 41,204 base stations for rural. 
Provide universal access to GSM 
signal and public broadband facilities. 
 
Power  Assuming trade stagnation, estimate optimal (least-cost) investment strategies for 
generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity in response to demand increases. 
Achieve exogenously determined electrification rates. 
Develop 440 MW of new generation capacity (no trade scenario). This scenario could 
be replaced under trade expansion with 2,200 MW of generation capacity and the 
needed megawatts in interconnectors. 
Raise electrification from 37 to 55 
percent of population (100 percent 
urban, 30 percent rural). 
 
 
Transport  Achieve regional (national) connectivity across Sudan with good-quality 2-lane (1-
lane) paved road. 
Provide rural road access to 100 percent of the highest-value agricultural land based 
on current production, plus providing rural road access to 50 percent of the 
nonproductive agricultural land with highest potential. 
Add or rehabilitate roads to have the following number of kilometers in good condition: 
5,372 km for national connectivity, 2,893 km for regional connectivity, 4,226 km in 
urban areas, and 34,200 km in rural areas. 
Provide urban road access within 500 
square meters. 
 
Water  Increase population with access to improved water to 72 percent of the population and 
access to improved sanitation to 76 percent of the population. 
Target technology mix for improved water: 
Piped water (23% urban, 0% rural), standposts (52% urban, 12% rural), safe wells 
(25% urban, 88% rural). 
Achieve Millennium Development 
Goals by preserving the current mix of 
sanitation technological options and 
clearing the sector rehabilitation 
backlog. 
 




Sudan would need to spend $4.2 billion a year—or 20 percent of its GDP—over the next decade to 
meet infrastructure targets (table 18). After South Africa and Nigeria, these are the largest infrastructure 
spending needs for any Sub-Saharan African country. They are broadly comparable to the needs faced by 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia. As explained earlier, the massive needs are driven by 
the initial starting conditions and are based on reasonable assumptions regarding what outputs are 
attainable. The estimates are conspicuously large (i) because the land area of the country is massive, with 
large pockets of uninhabited terrain, and (ii) because of the low starting point, particularly in the water 
and transport sectors. 
Table 18. Indicative infrastructure spending needs in Sudan, 2006–15 
US$ million per year 
Sector 
Capital expenditure  Operations and 
maintenance  Total needs  Total needs as 
share of GDP 
ICT  267  43  310  1.45 
Irrigation  —  —  —  — 
Power (nontrade)  320  104  424  1.98 
Transport   1,295  490  1,785  8.35 
Water supply and sanitation  1,422  280  1,701  7.97 
Total  3,303  917  4,220  19.8 
Source: Mayer and others 2008; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009; You and others, AICD 2009. 
Derived from models available online at www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/models. 
Note: ICT = information and communication technology. 
— = Not available 
 
The transport and the water and sanitation sectors have the highest financing needs. About 
$1.8 billion would be needed to provide minimum surface connectivity and around $1.7 billion would be 
needed each year to meet the MDGs for water and sanitation. Particularly in the water network, decades 
of war have created an enormous rehabilitation backlog. For example, 40 percent of rural water assets and 
42 percent of urban water assets need rehabilitation for Sudan as a whole. Transport needs are largely 
driven by the need to maintain regional corridors and upgrade existing rural tracks to make them usable. 
A distant second are the needs for power, at $424 million. The spending needs estimates assume that 
only the power infrastructure needed to meet domestic demand is developed. The estimates would be 
substantially higher if the development of power export potential were also considered—that is, if Sudan 
were also to fully develop its 3,000 MW of hydropower export potential, a further $1.1 billion would be 
needed annually to develop additional capacity and interconnectors. 
Needs estimates for ICT, at $310 million a year, are the lowest among the sectors. This is because of 
the recent ICT boom, which has largely been financed by the private sector. While an undersea cable is 
accessible via Port Sudan, overland connections to the cable need to be financed to complete the national 
ICT backbone.  
At 20 percent of GDP, Sudan’s needs are twice as high as other resource-rich economies in Africa 
and broadly comparable to those of low-income countries such as Kenya, Senegal, and Madagascar 
(figure 28). These needs in terms of the economy’s size are strikingly high given the recent oil influx and 
revamping of infrastructure investments. New investments account for over three-quarters of total needs SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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and are around 15 percent of GDP—roughly equivalent to what China has been investing on its own 
domestic infrastructure development in recent years.  
Figure 28. Sudan’s infrastructure spending needs in the regional context, as share of GDP 
Estimated infrastructure spending needed to meet targets, as percentage of GDP 
 
   
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. 
Note: Values excludes irrigation. 
LIC = low-income country; MIC = middle-income country; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; SSA = Sub-Saharan 
Africa; GDP = gross domestic product; O&M = operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure. 
 
Sudan already spends a sizable amount—$1.5 billion per year, or 7 percent of GDP—to meet its 
infrastructure needs (table 19). In terms of the economy’s size, the aggregates are comparable to what 
middle-income countries spend and perhaps slightly higher than what other resource-rich countries spend 
(figure 29). About 60 percent of the total infrastructure spending is allocated to capital expenses and 40 
percent to operating expenditures. Operating expenditure is entirely covered from budgetary resources 
and payments by infrastructure users. The composition of financiers indicates that Sudan has been able to 
capitalize on the interest of non–Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
investors and the private sector. 
Table 19. Financial flows to Sudan’s infrastructure, average 2001 to 2005 
$ millions per year 









sector  ODA  Non-OECD 
financiers  PPI  Total 
CAPEX 
ICT  4  5  0  35  209  249  253  1.18 
Power   281.9  104  0  304  0  409  690  3.23 
Transport   282.0  183  22  22  0  227  509  2.38 
WSS  2  6  12  5  7  31  32  0.15 
Total  570  298  35  366  215  915  1,485  6.95 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: O&M = operations and maintenance; ODA = official development assistance; PPI = private participation in infrastructure; CAPEX = 
capital expenditure; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information 
and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product. 
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Figure 29. Sudan’s current infrastructure spending is average by African standards 
 
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. 
Note: Values excludes irrigation. 
LIC = low-income country; MIC = middle-income country; COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; SSA = Sub-Saharan 
Africa; GDP = gross domestic product; O&M = operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure. 
 
The largest single financier of infrastructure investment is China, followed by Indian and Arab 
investors. Together they account for 40 percent of total annual investments, almost entirely allocated to 
the power sector. China’s partnership with Sudan in infrastructure development dates back to 2001, with 
cumulative total financing commitments on the order of $2 billion in 2010. Sudan benefits from a 
$3 billion framework agreement signed in December 2007, one of the largest to have been accorded to 
any African country to date. Chinese projects are providing some 2,200 MW of new thermal power 
generation, and the country is responsible for the now-completed 1,250 MW Merowe Dam and associated 
1,800 km transmission line. China has also been involved in the reconstruction of some 1,500 km of roads 
(table 20).  
Sudanese federal and state 
governments and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) account for an additional third of 
Sudan infrastructure investments, and 
have focused on transport and to some 
extent power. The remaining capital 
funding comes from the private sector, 
which, as in most of the rest of Africa, 
supports the ICT boom. ODA flows have 
played a very small role in capital 
infrastructure financing. 
Capital investments in Sudan are 
heavily skewed toward the power sector, 
much of this funded by China. Investment 
levels in ICT and transport are comparable 

















Table 20. Identified infrastructure projects financed by non-OECD 
financiers 
 US$ million 
Project  
costs 
China  949 
Construction of 300 MW gas-fired power plant in Al-Fulah  518 
Construction of the El-Gaili Combined Cycle Power Plant, Phase 1  150 
NEC transition line  81 
White Nile electricity network  200 
China and Arab countries  1,200 
Construction of the Merowe hydroelectric dam (1,250 MW)  1,200 
India  475 
Setting up 4x125 MW Kosti Combined Cycle Power Plant  475 
Total  2,624 
Source: Foster, etc (2009). Calculations based on World Bank-PPIAF Chinese 
project database. (http://ppi.worldbank.org), in current $ millions .  SUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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in magnitude, with the former sourced largely from the private sector and the latter from the public sector. 
Investments in water and sanitation are absent. 
Figure 30. Sudan’s pattern of capital investment in infrastructure and that of comparator countries 
Investment in infrastructure sectors as percentage of GDP, by source 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
Note: Private investment includes self-financing by households. ODA = official development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product; WSS = water supply and 
sanitation; LIC = low-income country. 
How much more can be done within the existing resource envelope? 
Even without increasing spending, additional resources could be directed toward infrastructure by 
eliminating inefficiencies. This report quantifies some operational inefficiencies based on measurable and 
observable performance indicators. The first type relates to operators and/or infrastructure providers, 
including utilities, SOEs, and special funds. For this type of estimate, providers within Sudan will be 
compared against well-functioning utilities in Africa and/or engineering norms. These comparisons will 
cover (i) underrecovery of costs: comparing effective tariffs and user fees against actual unit costs of 
providing the service; (ii) overstaffing: assessing the difference between average labor cost per 
connection of the utility evaluated against a well-functioning utility; (iii) distribution losses: assessing the 
difference between distribution of losses of the evaluated system against engineering norms for a system 
of similar age and characteristics; and (iv) undercollection: assessing the ability of the operator to collect 
bills within the year against a standard of full revenue collection. In addition, the analysis measures the 
ability of governmental agencies to execute their budget allocations for capital projects within the fiscal 
year.  
The analysis suggests that Sudan can recover $584 million each year by reducing inefficiencies in the 
system (table 21). Most of the efficiency gains are associated with aligning tariffs to cost-recovery levels 
and reducing distribution losses in both the water and power systems. Increasing tariffs to cost-recovery 
levels could save $378 million in power and $15 million in water sectors annually. Distributional losses in 
power cost $106 million per year, and another $27 million in the water sector. Undercollection of bills for 
water services could save a significant $35 million. Finally, budget underexecution is a significant issue 
in the transport sector, leading to underspending of about $20 million of available funds annually.  
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Table 21. Sudan’s potential gains from greater operational efficiency 
US$ million  ICT  Irrigation  Power  Transport  WSS  Total  Total as share 
of GDP 
Underrecovery of costs  —  n.a.  378  n.a.  15  393  1.84 
Overstaffing  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Distribution losses  —  n.a.  106  —  27  133  0.62 
Undercollection  —  n.a.  0  n.a.  35  35  0.17 
Low budget execution  0  n.a.  0  20  2  22  0.10 
Total  0  n.a.  484  20  79  584  2.73 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product. 
— = Not available. 
n.a. = Not applicable. 
 
The power sector offers the largest potential savings—up to $584 million per year—if the operational 
inefficiencies of its utility were tackled. Undercharging for power costs Sudan about $380 million each 
year, or around 1.8 percent of the country’s GDP. If compared with the rest of Africa, where underpricing 
of power is commonplace, the National Power Corporation of Sudan (NEC) is doing better than utilities 
in other resource-rich countries on average, but is nevertheless a poor performer (figure 31). 
Figure 31. Underpricing of power and water in Sudan  
Financial burden of underpricing, as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).  
 
The NEC’s 2004 distributional losses of 33.4 percent are three times the best-practice 10 percent 
benchmark, resulting in a staggering $106 million cost of inefficiencies.  
In the water sector, average tariffs stand at $0.6 per cubic meter versus an estimated $0.69 per cubic 
meter average cost-recovery tariff. The macroeconomic burden of 0.007 percent of GDP is much lower 
than that for power, but is comparatively higher than that of other resource-rich countries. 
Operational inefficiencies are also plaguing the water sector, and cost Sudan about $62 million a year, 

























Sudan Resource RichSUDAN’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 44 
water services and reducing nonrevenue water. In the water sector, the burden of operational utility 
inefficiencies is considerably higher than for the benchmark countries (figure 32).  
Figure 32. The burden of inefficiency in Sudan’s power and water utilities 
a. Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses in the power sector, as a 
percentage of GDP 
b. Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses in the water sector, as a 
percentage of GDP  
   
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
Annual funding gap 
Sudan’s annual infrastructure funding gap amounts to $2.9 billion per year, or roughly 14 percent of 
GDP (table 22). The largest funding gap is in the water and sanitation sector, followed closely by 
transport. Given strong private investment, only a small funding gap remains in ICT. In the case of power, 
existing spending is sufficient. But if power tariffs could be raised to cost-recovery levels, much more of 
this expenditure could be funded internally, freeing up external finance for other critically needed areas.  
Table 22. Funding gaps by sector 




Spending needs  (310)  —  (424)  (1,785)  (1,701)  (4,220)  (19.8) 
Existing spending*  253      424   509   32   1,218   5.7  
Reallocation potential within sectors  0      0   0   0   0    
Efficiency gains  0      484   20   79   584   2.7  
Funding gap  (57)     —  (1,255)  (1,590)  (2,902)  (13.6) 
Reallocation potential across 
sectors  0      267   0   0   267   1.2  
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: Estimates use the base scenario of spending needs. Potential overspending across sectors is not included in the calculation of the 
funding gap, because it cannot be assumed that it would be applied toward other infrastructure sectors. 
WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product. 
*traced to needs 
**Assuming complete fungibility across sectors 
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What else can be done?  
Sudan’s funding gap is large relative to the size of its economy, and enormous with respect to its 
current level of spending. Nevertheless, there are a number of options that could make it more 
manageable, including raising additional finance, taking additional cost-cutting measures, and 
lengthening the period of time allotted for meeting the illustrative infrastructure targets. In any case, given 
the magnitude of the gap, difficult decisions will have to be taken regarding the prioritization of the 
different investments. 
There are realistic prospects for increasing the flow of resources to infrastructure. Although not all 
components of the required infrastructure platform are suitable for private finance (particularly roads, 
water, and sanitation), other components may be (for example, ICT, power generation, and ports). 
Challenges for attracting private investors are conspicuous particularly due to the country risks linked to 
the instability of the country, repeated violations of the rule of law, and the very poor ranking of Sudan’s 
governance compared to its peers in Africa. 
Sudan has captured private investment commitments worth around 1 percent of its GDP, 
predominantly in the ICT sector. Many other African countries have done significantly better in this area 
(figure 33). Countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, and 
Senegal have all captured between 1.8 and 2.5 percent of GDP, while the most successful country in this 
regard—Guinea-Bissau—has captured in excess of 3.0 percent of GDP.  
Figure 33. Many African countries capture more private investment than Sudan 
 
Source: PPI Project Database. (http://ppi.worldbank.org), in current $ millions. 
 
Adopting lower-cost technologies could substantially reduce the cost of meeting the posited 
infrastructure targets, and help make the funding gap manageable. Meeting the MDGs for water supply 
and sanitation with lower-cost technologies than previously used (such as stand posts, boreholes, and 
improved latrines), could reduce the associated price tag from $1,701 million to $889 million each year. 
Similarly, meeting transport connectivity standards using lower-cost road-surfacing technologies (such as 
single-surface treatment) together with a rural policy that narrows its focus exclusively to provide 100 
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the associated price tag from $1,785 million to $771 million. The overall savings from these measures 
would amount to $2 billion for Sudan (table 23). 
If Sudan were 
unable to raise 
additional financing or 
reduce infrastructure 
costs, the only way to 
meet the targets 
identified here would be 
to take longer than ten 
years to do so. If the 
country were able to instantly realize all potential efficiency gains while holding spending at current 
levels, it could meet the identified infrastructure targets within 30 years. These simulations underscore the 
importance of making progress on the efficiency agenda, which could propel the country forward toward 
meeting its infrastructure targets. 
 





innovation  Savings 
Savings as % 
of sector 
funding gap 
WSS appropriate technology  1,701  889  812  51 
Roads appropriate technology  1,785  1,124  660  53 
Total  3,486  2,014  1,472  51 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, AICD Flagship Report, 2009  
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation.  
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